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Abstract
Lotteries as sources of public funding are of particular interest because they combine
elements of both public finance and gambling in an often controversial mix.  Proponents of
lotteries point to the popularity of such games and justify their use because of the voluntary
nature of participation rather than the reliance on compulsory taxation.  
Whether lotteries are efficient or not can have the usual concerns related to public finance
and providing support for public spending, but there are also concerns about the efficiency of the
market for the lottery products as well, especially if the voluntary participants are not behaving
rationally.
These concerns can be addressed through an examination of the U.S. experience with
lotteries as sources of government revenues.  State lotteries in the U.S. are compared to those in
Europe to provide context on the use of such funding and the diversity of options available to
public officials.  While the efficiency of  lotteries in raising funds for public programs can be
addressed in a number of ways, one method is to consider whether the funds that are raised are
supplementing other sources of funding or substituting for them.  If lottery profits are “fungible”
or substituting for other sources that would have been used in the absence of such profits, then
the issues of equity and efficiency of lotteries relative to other sources are certainly heightened. 
The literature suggests that some degree of fungibility does exist, bringing these very concerns
into question.
Whether the lottery markets are efficient can be addressed, in part, by examining the
rationality of its participants.  This can be done by considering how consumers participate in the
market, how they respond to changing prices (or effective prices in the case of lotteries), and
whether the market ever provides its participants with a “fair bet,” a gamble in which there is a
positive expected value from participating.  While empirical studies provide somewhat mixed
results, there are indications that consumers of lottery products are relatively rational and that
lottery markets seldom provide “fair bets,” both indicators of efficient markets. 
JEL Classification Codes:  D81, H71, L83
Keywords: lotto, lottery, public finance, gambling
U.S. LOTTO MARKETS 
 
1. Introduction 
Lotteries have been commonplace in America from the earliest days of 
colonialism. Many public works including Boston’s famous Faniuel Hall as well as 
projects at illustrious universities such as Harvard and Princeton were partly funded by 
lotteries, which remained popular in throughout the country until the American Civil 
War. A nationwide backlash against gambling led to the decline of state-sponsored 
lotteries, however, and by the 1890s only Louisiana still operated a lottery game. 
Interestingly, as was seen again over a century later, the Louisiana Lottery Corporation’s 
monopoly on legalized gambling led to demand far outside the state’s borders with only 
7% of the company’s revenues being generated within Louisiana  (Louisiana Lottery 
Corporation, 2007). Allegations of corruption led to the collapse of the Louisiana Lottery 
in 1894 and left the United States without any state-sponsored games for 70 years. 
 In 1964, New Hampshire became the first state to reinstate a lottery game and 
other states soon followed suit. The first Canadian provinces restarted lotteries in 1970.  
By 2007, 42 states and the District of Columbia, as well as every Canadian province, 
sponsored lotteries. In the mid-1970s, state and provincial lottery associations began to 
join together to offer lotto games beginning with the formation of the Western Canada 
Lottery Corporation in 1974, the Tri-State Lotto, joining Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont, in 1985, the Multi-State Lottery Corporation (now more commonly known as 
Powerball) in 1988, and the Big Game/Mega-Millions Association in 1996 (Grote and 
Matheson, 2006a). Table 1 provides a list of every state lottery in the U.S. along with its 
year of initiation, the year that it joined a multi-state lottery as well as the multi-state 
association it joined, the annual sales and profits of each lottery association, and the per 
capita sales of lottery tickets in each state.  
The expansion of legalized gambling through state lotteries has proven popular 
for at least two reasons that will be explored in depth in this chapter. First, as more states 
legalized lottery games or other types of gambling, bordering states felt increasingly 
pressured to legalize lotteries within their own states. If gambling opportunities were 
widely available across state lines, a prohibition on gambling with the state may not 
result in a lower incidence of gambling but could instead simply lead to gambling dollars 
being spent in neighboring jurisdictions. The potential loss of local revenues to lotteries 
or casinos in other nearby states has been a prime argument for legalizing and expanding 
gambling in the United States. 
 Second, lottery associations typically designate all or a portion of the fund 
collected to “good works.” In the UK, for example, 40% of the sales price of each ticket 
is retained by the government with a significant percentage of this amount designated for 
the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. In the United States, more often than not, 
lottery funds are also designated for special purposes with education being the most 
common recipient of lottery proceeds. Thus, lottery tickets, like church bingo or other 
charitable gambing, may be perceived as a more “conscientious” choice by gamblers than 
privately run casinos or racetracks. Critics of lotteries, however, argue that all 
government revenues are fungible, and that by designating lottery proceeds towards 
eduction, for example, government officials simply find it easier to reduce other funding 
sources for education.  
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 States typically offer a wide variety of gambling products through their lottery 
associations which can be placed in a variety of categories. The most popular lottery 
product in the United States are instant win scratchcard games. These lottery tickets sells 
for between $1 and $20 and allow gamblers to instantly win small to medium sized 
prizes. These games have the advantage of providing instant gratification (or despair) to 
players, but instant games cannot award large prizes without placing significant risk on 
the lottery association. For example, suppose a scratchcard game offers a single $1 
million prize to the lucky winner and suppose the lottery association distributes 2 million 
$1 dollar tickets. On the surface it appears that this game will return a 50% payout to 
players and 50% to the lottery association. If players find out immediately whether they 
have won the grand prize, however, the lottery association will only be able to sell tickets 
to this game until the prize is won, which on average will occur at the one-millionth 
ticket. Thus, a game that initially appears to have a 50% payoff to the lottery association 
will actually have zero net expected return to the seller. For this reason, instant win 
games generally award many modest prizes rather than a small number of larger prizes. 
 The other type of games are on-line or drawing games such as lotto, numbers, or 
keno. These games involve players selecting numbers from a set of possibilities. Players 
are issued a ticket with their choices, and these numbers are checked against numbers 
selected at a designated drawing. Players who match more of the numbers win 
increasingly large prizes. Lotto games in particular have the interesting feature that when 
no player wins the grand prize by matching all of the numbers in a particular drawing, the 
money allocated to the jackpot pool is typically “rolled-over” into the jackpot pool for the 
next drawing, raising the potential jackpot for the subsequent drawing. Because the 
jackpot prize fund is allowed to roll-over in this manner, the jackpot prize can become 
quite large if no one hits the jackpot in a number of successive periods. Indeed, 
advertised jackpots exceeding $50 million are quite common in both the U.S. and 
Europe, and occasionally lotto jackpots have been known to exceed $250 million. 
 In some states, on-line instant win games and video lottery are available. On-line 
instant win games are a hybrid of scratchcards and on-line games that provide the instant 
satisfaction of scratchcards with the ability to win the larger prizes that offer. Video 
lottery is simply a state-sponsored gaming machine more akin to slot machines or other 
casino gaming than traditional lottery games.  The availability of video lottery explains at 
least some of the variation in state-by-state per capita lottery sales shown in Table 1. 
 
2. Differences Between American and European Lotteries 
While in many aspects European and American lotteries tend to be quite similar, 
there are noticeable differences between the two continents. First, the share of tickets 
sales accruing to the government is typically larger in Europe than in the U.S. The UK 
National Lottery keeps 40% of ticket proceeds as government revenue and returns 50% 
as prize money with the remainder going to pay for retailer commissions and 
administrative costs. In the United States, only Oregon and West Virginia exceed a 40% 
government take with the average association receiving only 28% of ticket sales. Two 
states, Rhode Island and South Dakota, retain less than 20% of revenues as profits. As 
administrative expenses and commissions are similar in America and the UK, the portion 
of ticket sales designated to prize money is correspondingly higher in the U.S. It must be 
noted, however, that lottery winnings are subject to income taxes in the United States 
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while they are exempt in Britain and Canada, at least, significantly reducing net returns in 
the U.S. and raising government’s share of the total ticket price. 
 Next, lotto jackpot prizes in Europe are paid in cash while lotto jackpots in the 
U.S. are paid in annuities usually over 20-30 years. The advertised prize in the U.S. is the 
undiscounted sum of the annuity payments. Lottery winners can choose to take their 
lottery winnings in a lump sum instead of the annuity payments, but the lump sum is 
typically 50-60% of the size of the advertised jackpot depending on the length of the 
annuity and the prevailing interest rates. Thus, while the large American multi-state 
lotteries, Powerball and Mega-millions, like to advertise that as of 2007 between the two 
games they have awarded the 15 largest jackpots in the history of gambling, in fact, at 
least three advertised jackpots in the EuroMillions lottery would rank among the 5 largest 
jackpots in history in terms of cash value rather than advertised value. (See Grote and 
Matheson (2003) for an analysis of the effects of annuity payments on gambler 
behaviour.) Combining the effects of annuities and the taxability of prize winnings, the 
net present after-tax value of the advertised jackpots of American lotteries tend to be 
roughly one-third the size of their advertised values. 
 Finally, the most popular European lotteries tend to be much more egalitarian in 
their distribution of prizes than the most frequently played games in the U.S.. In Europe, 
lower tier prizes are awarded larger shares of the prize pool and game matrices are set so 
that roll-over jackpots are relatively less common. For example, the UK National Lottery 
sells tickets for 1₤, and players choose 6 numbers from a field of 49. Players who match 
3 of the 6 numbers correctly win 10₤, the smallest prize that can be won. At least 11 state 
lottery games in the U.S. have offered an identical play matrix. In these games the prize 
for a $1 ticket for matching 3 of 6 numbers averaged roughly $3.50 and ranged from $0 
to $6, generally less than half that offered by the UK Lottery for its smallest prize.  
The allocation of prize money to the jackpot prize pool is correspondingly higher 
in America as well. While the UK Lottery and and Euromillions each allocate 16-17% of 
every euro or pound wagered to the jackpot prize pool, a random survey of roughly 40 
American lotto games finds the corresponding percentages allocated to the grand prize 
ranges from 19% to 43% of each dollar wagered with the average lottery providing 
slightly more than 30% of the funds collected to the jackpot, nearly double the 
percentage of the two European lotteries.  
The jackpot prize pool also tends not to roll over as much in European lotteries as 
compared to those in the U.S.  Lottery associations face a tradeoff in determining the 
optimal odds for a lotto game. By offering games with longer odds but bigger grand-
prizes, they could potentially attract more buyers. Numerous authors including Garrettt 
and Sobel (1999: 2004) and Forrest, et al., (2002) and have suggested that lotto players 
are attracted by the high jackpots and not the expected return, and lotto is popular due to 
the “skewness” of the bet rather than its expected return. Lottery associations realize, 
however, that if the odds are too high, jackpots will be won very infrequently, and, 
therefore, the games will not benefit from frequent media exposure surrounding jackpot 
winners. Indeed, Britiain’s Lotto Extra game was discontinued in 2006 after several long 
stretches without a winner (Forrest and Alagic, 2007). Lottery officials are, therefore, 
forced to choose between offering games with high jackpots and ones with frequent 
winners.  
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 To this end, in the mid 1970s, state and provincial lottery associations began to 
join together to offer lotto games beginning with the formation of the Western Canada 
Lottery Corporation in 1974, the Tri-State Lotto, joining Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont, in 1985, the Multi-State Lottery Corporation (now more commonly known as 
Powerball) in 1988, and the Big Game/Mega-Millions Association in 1996. By merging 
games, states could offer larger jackpots, but the increased number of players would 
assure that the grand prize was won on a regular basis.  
Until the early 2000s, states with smaller populations generally offered lotto by 
being a member of one of the two major multi-state games (Powerball and Big 
Game/Mega-Millions) while more populous states could offer high prizes through 
independent lotto games. For example, as of January 2000, eight states (CA, TX, NY, FL, 
PA, OH, WA, and CO) operated lotto games but not did belong to a multi-state game. Of 
these eight states, six ranked among the seven largest states by population.By the early 
2000s, however, perhaps due to the record $250 million adevertised jackpots offered 
during several Powerball and Mega-Millions drawings, even these hold-out states began 
to join in the multi-state associations so that by July 2005, only Florida remained 
independent from any multi-state lotto game. Similarly, in 2004 the national lottery 
associations of the UK, France, Spain, and six other countries joined together to offer 
EuroMillions, which offers among the highest jackpots in Europe. See Table 1 for a list 
of state lotteries and the multistate lottery to which they belong. 
Because of the larger number of ticket buyers, both the Megamillions and 
Powerball multi-state games can offer substantially higher advertised jackpots than most 
state games.  While the odds of winning these games are also lower than those of the 
state lotto games, there is not as much sacrifice in terms of the frequency of jackpot 
winners as there was in single state games. The relationship between population of 
potential ticket buyers and the structure of the game can be more precisely explained 
through an odds to population ratio. 
 Clotfelter and Cook (1993) note that most frequent odds to population ratio for 
lotto games in the U.S. in the early 1990s was roughly 1. That is, a lottery association 
serving a population base of 13 million could offer a game with odds of roughly 1 in 13 
million and maintain a reasonable frequency of jackpot winners. The U.K. National 
Lottery, on the other hand, serves roughly 60 million people with a game that offers odds 
of 1 in about 14 million for a 0.25 odds to population ratio. The EuroMillions game 
offers odds of 1 in 76 million to a population base of just over 200 million or a 0.38 ratio. 
The National Lottery ratio is less than half that of the lowest ratio reported by Clotfelter 
and Cook for state lotteries in 1990, and the EuroMillions lottery’s ratio is less than one-
third that of either of the two large multistate games in the U.S., Powerball (1 in 146 
million odds and 126 million population for a ratio of 1.15) and MegaMillions (1 in 175 
million odds and 137 million population for a ratio of 1.27).  
Table 2 provides comparisions two American lotto games in Florida and Texas as 
well as the two large multi-state games, Megamillions and Powerball, compared to two 
European games, the UK National Lotto and Euromillions. The time frames for each 
game examine periods over which the prize structure in each game remained unchanged. 
Column 3 lists the average jackpot pool for each drawing of the games converted to net 
present value in the case of the American games and to dollar values using average 
annual exchange rates in the case of the European games. Column 4 lists the average 
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number of times per year that the jackpot is won by at least one ticket in each game. 
Column 5 lists the average number of rollovers before the jackpot is finally won in each 
game. The final column lists the average number of winners when the jackpot is actually 
awarded. 
As can be seen, the American games offer larger jackpots which are less 
frequently won than their European counterparts. Note that Euromillions has weekly 
rather than biweekly drawings, as did the UK National Lottery for roughly its first two 
years of existence, so the figures in Column 4 actually understate the relative frequency 
at which American games are won in comparison to European games. The data also show 
that the UK lotto only infrequently rolls over, and Euromillions rolls over at a rate less 
than one-third that of its big American counterparts. Even when a jackpot is won, it is 
much more likely to be shared among multiple winners in Europe than in the United 
States. 
 
3. Fungibility of Lottery Revenues 
As stated previously, one possible reason for the popularity of state (and multi-
state, national, and multi-national) lottery games is that the revenues from such games 
can be used to enhance funding of particular state programs.  This earmarking of funds 
for a designated purpose appears to be important to both the successful passage of and 
the ongoing support for state lottery games.  Of the 42 U.S. states (plus the District of 
Columbia) that provide lottery games, only 17 allow for the revenues from those games 
to go directly into that state’s general fund.1 Ten of those states earmark at least a portion 
of lottery revenues for a designated purpose.  The remaining 25 states earmark all 
revenues from lottery games for specific government programs, with education being the 
primary beneficiary.  Table 3 provides a more detailed summary of the legislated use of 
lottery revenues by state.2
A question that has arisen in the literature on lotteries as a source of state finances 
is whether these earmarked funds actually enhance spending dollar-for-dollar for the 
designated programs or if state legislators substitute earmarked dollars for dollars that 
would have come from the state’s general funds had earmarking not occurred.  The latter 
concept of substitution of state funds is referred to as fungibility, and the fungibility of 
funds can either be partial or total depending on the degree of substitution that occurs. 
Several published studies have tested for the fungibility of government revenues 
from lotteries in U.S. states using different variables and statistical techniques, but most 
tend to agree that fungibility, at least to some degree, is present when funds are 
earmarked for specific state and local programs.   
Mikesell and Zorn (1986) construct a time-series for government expenditures on 
education in a state as a percent of overall state and local government spending.  They 
find that this percentage only increases in one of the three states examined after the 
introduction of earmarked funding from a state lottery game.  In the other two states, 
there was actually a decrease in the percentage of funding to education immediately 
                                                          
1 Some states designate that excess lottery revenues will be available for general funds if a threshold level 
of revenues for earmarked spending is met. 
2 Note that “revenues” are more accurately designated as “profits” on the table since it is assumed that 
administrative costs and prize money are already removed by the time the money is used to fund state 
expenditures. 
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following the introduction of earmarked lottery revenues.  While the authors note that 
this is not the best test of fungibility since other factors may also be influencing the 
change in relative spending on education, it is an indicator that there was not a greater 
relative emphasis on education spending after the introduction of earmarked funding for 
that specified purpose. 
Borg and Mason (1988; 1990) provided two studies of fungibility. The 1988 
contribution considers the state of Illinois and its expenditures on education both before 
and after the introduction of a state lottery with profits earmarked for education.  Using 
regression analysis and a Chow test, there is shown to be a statistically signifant change 
in the trend for expenditures on education, with education expenditures rising at a lower 
rate after the introduction of the lottery, in spite of the lottery revenues available for such 
spending. 
The 1990 contribution by Borg and Mason includes analysis of state expenditures 
on education in five states with lotteries that earmark profits for education and in seven 
states without lotteries.  While there are mixed results for nominal spending on education 
in the five lottery states, real spending on education declines in all five of those states.  
Taken alone, this may indicate that fungibility of real spending on education is occurring; 
however, the seven non-lottery states also experienced a decline in real education 
spending over the same time period.  Similar to Mikesell and Zorn (1986), this is not 
necessarily direct evidence of fungibility, but it certainly brings into question the 
commitment of funding to education after the introduction of lottery games that pledge 
the commitment of funds for that purpose. 
Borg, Mason and Shapiro (1991) performed a cross-sectional analysis of states to 
detect the impact of lottery funding on per-student expenditures on education.  A dummy 
variable is included in the regression analysis to indicate if a state provides for earmarked 
funding to education via a state lottery.  Their findings indicate that states with such 
funding have a statistically significant lower level of spending per-student, providing an 
indirect indication of fungibility. 
Spindler (1995) tests for the fungibility of lottery revenues in seven states that 
earmark such revenues for educational programs.  Using the ratio of education 
expenditures to general expenditures for each state as the dependent variable, Spindler 
constructs time-series ARIMA models to provide statistical evidence of fungibility in 
varying degrees in all seven states.  Even more conclusively, however, there is evidence 
that the ratio of education to general expenditures actually declines significantly in four 
of those states after the introduction of a lottery game. 
Three studies consider the impact of earmarked funding on state education 
expenditures in the state of Florida.  Stark, Wood and Honeyman (1993) provide 
evidence that there is not enough of an increase in per-student funding for education in 
Florida to account for the added state revenues from its lottery.  They estimate that over 
55% of the funds devoted to education from lottery revenues were, in fact, substituting 
for funding that would have come from the state if the lottery were not present.  
Summers, Honeyman, Wattenbarger and Miller (1995) provide some support for the 
fungibility of education spending in Florida by considering the impact of lottery revenues 
on total allocations to community colleges in the state.  They find that the combined 
allocation to community colleges from both the lottery and general funds from the state 
account for a smaller share of total funding sources available community colleges after 
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the state lottery began.  Similarly, Land and Alsikafi (1999) find that there is a 
statistically significant decline in the growth rate of per-student (FTE) expenditures in 
community colleges in Florida after the introduction of the lottery.  This is due, in large 
part, to the significant decline in per-student allocations from the state to community 
colleges in the post-lottery years.  Part of this decline is due to a substantial increase in 
community college enrolments in the post-lottery years.  However, the authors note that 
rather than providing additional funding to maintain current levels of per-student 
revenues to community colleges, the legislature opted to substitute lottery revenues for 
the necessary general funds.Garrett (2001) also focuses his empirical study of fungibility 
on a single state, Ohio, that like the state of Florida also earmarks its profits from the 
state lottery to education.  Similar to the study by Spindler, Garrett also uses an ARIMA 
model for his regression analysis, although real education expenditures per student are 
used as the dependent variable.  Garrett also attempts to measure the degree of fungibility 
in lottery funding that occurs.  His study finds that the earmarking of lottery funds in 
Ohio does not lead to a significant increase in per-student expenditures on education by 
the state, concluding that the funds are, to a large degree, fungible. 
Erekson, DeShano, Platt and Ziegert (2002) conduct both a cross-sectional and 
time-series analysis of all 50 states over a five-year period to provide for a more 
complete study of fungibility.  The  models regress the expenditures on education as 
percentage of general revenues for each state on a variety of theoretically important 
economic variables as well as a dummy variable for states that introduce a lottery and a 
variable for lottery revenues per capita.  The estimation on the coefficient for lottery 
revenues per capita is negative and significant, indicating that fungibility does occur 
when lottery revenues are used to finance state expenditures, regardless of whether they 
are earmarked or not.  Additional results indicate that for every $1 per capita in lottery 
revenues generated as funding for a state, there is a loss of approximately 1 to 1.5% of 
education funding available. 
Novarro (2005), similar to Erekson, DeShano, Platt and Ziegert also theorizes the 
importance of including both cross-sectional and time-series analysis to address the 
fungibility issue.  The dependent variable used in the analysis is similar to previous 
studies, however, in that she utilizes state expenditures on education per student.  She 
also uses lottery profits per student as one of the independent variables in the model; 
however, she separates the effects of lottery profits depending on whether the profits are 
earmarked for educational purposes or are used as general funds by the state.  By 
separating out the two types of earmarking, Novarro is able to conclude that while 
earmarking funds does indeed result in fungibility, earmarking provides relatively more 
revenues to a designated program than if the lottery revenues are not earmarked.  Her 
model estimates that earmarked lottery profits for education tend to increase spending on 
education by approximately 79 cents for every $1 in lottery profits, while $1 in non-
earmarked lottery profits tend to increase education spending by only 43 cents on 
average. 
Given the statistical evidence, both direct and indirect, on the presence of 
fungibility of earmarked lottery revenues in these studies, it should bring into question 
the practice of earmarking lottery revenues if it merely allows for substitution of state 
dollars for legislative programs rather than supplementing those dollars.  Obviously the 
degree of fungibility that occurs is highly important, as is the issue of whether 
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earmarking lottery revenues is relatively better than allowing state legislatures more 
discretion regarding their use 
 
4. Efficiency of Lottery Markets – Part 1 
Since the price of a lotto ticket and the odds of winning remain fixed regardless of 
the size of the jackpot, the expected return from the purchase of a lottery ticket 
continuously changes along with the size of the jackpot. This varying return from a 
repeated game with fixed odds makes lotto almost unique among games of chance. 
Craps, slots, roulette, bingo, keno, instant win lottery tickets, and lotto games without a 
rollover component all have fixed odds but also constant expected returns. Horse racing 
provides varying rates of return but is not a repeated game with fixed odds. Perhaps the 
only other similar gamble is blackjack when played by an expert card-counter where the 
game exhibits fixed payoffs but varying odds of winning depending upon which cards 
have already been played. The non-constant nature of the expected return of lotto has 
made the game the subject of extensive academic research and provides for interesting 
opportunities to explore the efficiency of betting markets and the rationality of gamblers.  
 Of course, some may question whether one can ever consider rational any 
gambling activity with a negative expected return. While this is a valid concern, 
gambling clearly offers non-pecuniary benefits to players in the form of thrills or 
excitement. In the words of one Big Game ticket buyer during the record $363 million, 
May 2000 drawing, “One dollar is a small price to pay to be able to dream about winning 
$300 million.”  
 Accepting the idea of gambling itself as rational behavior, one may address more 
detailed concepts of rationality and market efficiency. At least three notions of rationality 
can be explored using lotto games. First, rationality requires that individual bettors 
choose the gamble with the highest expected return per dollar played. Second, as 
expected return rises, more bettors should enter into the market and existing bettors 
should gamble more. Finally, lotto games should never provide a positive expected 
return. 
It is generally conceded that state lotteries have among the worst average 
expected payoffs among games of chance. While sports betting returns 91%, slot 
machines return 89%, bingo returns 74%, and blackjack returns 97%, state lotteries 
generally return only 50% to 60% gross revenues to players in the form of prizes. Several 
theories explain the popularity of lottery tickets in the face of such low expected returns.  
 First, lottery tickets are an extremely convenient form of gambling. While horse 
racing and dog racing are offered at roughly 150 and 45 tracks around the U.S., 
respectively, and casino gambling is legal in about 1,200 American casinos (roughly 2/3 
of which are in just 5 states: Nevada, Montana, California, Washington, and Oklahoma), 
lottery tickets are sold at over 150,000 retailers across the country. Furthermore, unlike 
casinos and racetracks, which are specialized gambling institutions, most lottery tickets 
are sold in gas stations and convenience stores and can be purchased along with other 
items. 
 Second, a noted previously, lottery associations more often than not designate 
proceeds to specific “good works” such as education or sport and recreation. Similarly, 
bingo, which is often offered by churches or other non-profit organizations, also offers a 
relatively low return. 
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 Finally, the skewness of the bet and the high potential winnings offer one of the 
few gambling opportunities that present the possibility of a truly “life-changing” event. 
Few gamblers are likely to dream about what their life would be like if they won $100 in 
their weekly local football pool, but thoughts of instantly becoming a multi-millionaire 
are another thing entirely. Indeed, the handful of lotteries known to return even less than 
half of revenues to prizes have offered very high jackpots. High maximum prizes tend to 
reduce the importance of expected value in lotteries.  
 Once the decision to play lotto over other games of chance is made, the question 
becomes whether or not bettors play the game in a way that reflects rationality in terms of 
maximizing expected return subject to the conditions of the game. The evidence of 
rationality on the part of lotto players is mixed but tends to reflect at least some degree of 
rational decision-making on the part of lotto players.  
 Since the jackpot and often the lower tier prizes are paid in a pari-mutuel fashion 
in lotto games, players can increase their expected returns by playing “rare” numbers. On 
the reasonable assumption that every number combination is equally likely to be chosen, 
by selecting rarely played numbers, bettors can decrease the number of fellow players 
with whom they have to share the prize pool if they win. Most lotto games either allow a 
computer to randomly select numbers or allow players to choose their own numbers. 
When players select their own numbers, certain combinations such as multiples of 7, 
birthdays, or vertical or diagonal columns on the play slip, are more commonly played 
than others.  
 For example, an examination of the first 801 drawings in the Texas Lotto shows 
that the average payout for choosing 5 out of 6 numbers correctly was $1,656 and $105 
for choosing 4 of 6 correctly. However, in the 6 drawings where the smallest number 
drawn was 29 or higher, the average payouts were $2,040 and $141 respectively while in 
the 13 drawings where the highest number drawn was 28 or lower, the average payouts 
were $922 and $67 on average. Playing rare numbers, in this case numbers that did not 
correspond with dates, resulted in roughly a 25% increase in return above the average 
and over a 100% increase over the “common” numbers. Similarly, the January 14, 1995 
drawing of the UK Lotto resulted in 133 grand-prize winners, approximately 25 times the 
expected number, due to the selection of a set of numbers corresponding to an interesting 
pattern on the lotto play slip. The resulting jackpot prize of 122,510£ per winner was the 
lowest in the history of the National Lottery and roughly 5% of the size of the typical 
grand-prize. 
The extent to which the distribution of numbers played deviates from a uniform 
distribution, and hence the ability that players have to earn above normal returns, is 
examined in depth elsewhere in this volume (Haigh, 2008) as well as by others (Farrell et 
al., 2000; Papachristou and Karamanis, 1998). As an approximation, however, since 
roughly 70% of all lotto tickets sold in the U.S. use computer generated numbers, which 
can be reasonably assumed to follow a uniform distribution, any supernormal expected 
returns are limited to the deviation from uniformity by the 30% of tickets that are sold to 
players who select their own numbers. Furthermore, as lotto jackpots grow, the 
percentage of players selecting their own numbers falls, further reducing any ability of 
players to select advantageous numbers during periods of high jackpots. Still, this 
phenomenon is a clear violation of rationality and has been widely examined by 
Clotfelter and Cook (1989), MacLean et al. (1992), Thaler and Ziemba (1988), and 
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MacLean and  
Ziemba (1999) among others. The observed deviation in existing lotteries has been 
shown to occasionally be large enough to allow some lotteries to provide positive net 
expected returns to bettors playing the rarest combinations. While returns exceeding 
$2.00 per dollar played have been reported, due to the long odds involved, the player 
would have to play hundreds of thousands of draws before the strategy would, on 
average, pay a positive return (Ziemba, 1986). 
 
5. Efficiency of Lottery Markets – Part 2 
Another possible definition of rationality is that ticket sales will always increase 
when the expected return rises and will always fall when expected returns fall. An 
examination of the correlation between advertised jackpots and ticket sales shows a clear 
increase in ticket sales in response to higher expected returns as would be expected in 
efficient markets.   
Violations of rationality that occur when ticket sales rise despite a decrease in the 
expected return can occur during rollovers when the number of ticket buyers rises at a 
faster rate than the advertised jackpot and have been named “Lottomania” or “Lotto 
Fever” by Beenstock and Haitovsky (2001) and Grote and Matheson (2004). 
Testing whether lotto fever exists in actual lottery ticket markets requires an 
estimate of the expected return from the purchase of a lottery ticket. Several researchers 
have presented estimates of this expected return starting with Clotfelter and Cook (1989) 
and including DeBoer (1990), Shapira and Venezia (1992), Gulley and Scott (1993) and 
Matheson (2001). Matheson (2001) presents the most detailed equation for the expected 
return, ERt, from the purchase of a single lottery ticket. 
 
(1)    τθθ     w+w  +  -1   Be - 1  dvrAV +  Vw  = ER ji
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where wi is the probability of winning lower-tier prize i, Vit is the cash value of lower-tier 
prize i at time t, wj is the probability of winning the jackpot prize, AVjt is the advertised 
jackpot prize at time t, dvrt is a divisor used to convert the advertised annuitized jackpot 
into a net present value, BBt is the number of other ticket buyers for the drawing in period 
t, θ is the tax rate, and τ is the price of a ticket. 
Lottery ticket sales almost always increase from drawing to drawing if the jackpot 
is not won, so rationality requires the expected return from the purchase of a lottery ticket 
to also be strictly increasing from drawing to drawing in order to explain the increasing 
ticket sales. This requires ERt > ER(t-1)  for all drawings within a jackpot cycle. Setting 
ERt > ER(t-1) and canceling out like terms, assuming that the conversion factor from the 
advertised jackpot to the net present value of the jackpot remains unchanged between 
drawings, leaves equation (2). 
 
(2)  Be  V Be  V tw B-tjtw B-jt jtjt 1)1( /)1(/)1( 1 −− −−>−
 
This arrangement is convenient because it eliminates problematic issues such as 
the appropriate tax rates to use as well as avoiding the problem of determining the size of 
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the lower-tier prizes when these prizes are determined in a para-mutuel fashion. Equation 
(2) can be further rearranged to leave equation (3). 
 
(3)    e  B e  BV V w B-tw B-ttjjt jtjt )1(/)1(/ 1)1( 1 −−> −− −
 
If equation (3) does not hold as the jackpot rises, then the purchase of a lottery 
ticket becomes an increasingly worse investment as the jackpot rises. In practice, 
however, Grote and Matheson (2004; 2005) have shown that lotto fever is exceedingly 
rare, occurring in only 12 cases out of over 23,000 American lottery drawings examined. 
Such instances are concentrated in record-sized jackpots in large games and have become 
less common over time.  
Violations of rationality that occur when ticket sales do not rise despite an 
increase in expected return are known in the literature as “lottery apathy” or “jackpot 
fatigue” and have been investigated by DeBoer (1990), Grote and Matheson (2005; 
2007a). It is an observed fact that lottery sales for most individual games has fallen over 
time. This decline is explained in part by the rise of recently legalized forms of non-
lottery gambling or the introduction of new lottery products. For example, the expansion 
of casino gaming or the adoption of lotteries by neighboring states may have significant 
effects on lotto sales within a state.  
The effects of casino gaming on lottery sales in the United States have not been 
well explored because of the difficulty obtaining gaming revenue data from Native 
American casinos, which operate in roughly half of the states.The effects of neighboring 
lottery games has been well explored, however, as have the effects of the introduction of 
new games on existing games within a state. Researchers including Stover (1990) and 
Garrett and Marsh (2002) have clearly identified significant cross-border effects for 
lottery gambling. The expansion of lotteries to nearly every state has led to a decline in 
lotto play for states that had state lotteries previously as a decrease in cross border play 
occurs. Some cross-border gambling still exists, particularly between states that are 
members of different multistate games. Advertised jackpots exceeding $250 million are 
attractive lures for neighboring states. Border counties have been shown to experience 
disproportionately large increases in ticket sales during large multistate jackpots when 
the neighboring state is not a member of their particular multistate game (Oster, 2004). 
Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2004) find that within country competition 
between lotto games appears quite limited in the UK, but Grote and Matheson (2006a; 
2007b) suggest a significant degree of cannibalism between games in American states 
that offer multiple lotto games. The degree of substitutability appears to be particularly 
high in states where two or more lotto games have similar characteristics in terms of 
average jackpots. Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons discovered no such evidence in the UK 
Lottery, attributing this result to the fact that the UK lottery association, Camelot, “has 
successfully designed and marketed games that each appeal to bettors in different ways.” 
Forrest, Gulley and Simmons also find little evidence that the different lotto games in the 
UK are complements for one another while Grote and Matheson find that while the 
presence of a multistate lottery game decreases sales overall for an existing state lotto 
game, during periods of large multistate jackpots ticket sales for other lotto games within 
states that are members of the multistate lottery association increase modestly as well. 
Grote and Matheson attribute this increase to a reduction in transaction costs. 
 12
A final anomaly identified in lotto sales is the the “Halo Effect,” that is an 
increase in lottery ticket sales in the periods immediately following a large jackpot being 
won. Various researchers have attributed this bump in sales to irrational bettors 
influenced by increased media attention surrounding the recent large jackpot. Grote and 
Matheson (2007), however, suggest that the anomaly may be explained as simply as 
bettors cashing in tickets winning smaller prizes and reinvesting the proceeds in new 
tickets.  
 
6. Efficiency of Lottery Markets – Part 3 
A final definition of rationality in lottery markets, first proposed by Scott and 
Gulley (1995), is that lottery games should never, or at least quite rarely, provide their 
participants with a bet with a positive expected value. Several papers have identified 
specific instances of “fair bets” in lotto drawings including Krautmann and Ciecka (1993) 
and Matheson (2001). Grote and Matheson (2005; 2006b) present the most ambitious 
tests of this definition of rationality by examining nearly 23,000 drawings of American 
lottery games. Using the expected return found in equation (1), they find 290 instances 
where the purchase of a single randomly selected lottery ticket would have provided an 
after-tax expected return exceeding the cost of the ticket. The returns here exclude any 
additional money that could be earned by playing rare combinations as described 
previously. Examples of fair bets tend to be concentrated in smaller state lotteries that 
advertise relatively low jackpots but with substantially better odds of winning than the 
biggest state and multistate games. The smaller games do not attract as many additional 
ticket buyers when their jackpots become relatively large, and therefore the higher 
returns they offer are not as diluted by the prospect of potentially having to share the 
jackpot among multiple winners.  
With less than 1.3% of drawings providing a positive expected return, it can 
reasonably be concluded that lottery games are generally efficient. Even those drawings 
providing positive returns subject the player to substantial risk, and only provide a fair 
bet if the player is assumed to be risk neutral. Investment strategies based on buying 
single tickets during draws with the “best” jackpots would only provide positive median 
returns with investment horizons that, literally, exceed one-hundred thousand years in 
length. 
As noted by Haigh (2008), suppose a gambler utilizes a strategy that considers 
both large jackpots and the playing of rare combinations as examined by MacLean et al 
(1992) and MacLean and Ziemba (1999). Under scenario A the lotto game has a medium-
sized rollover, and the winning combination is fairly unpopular while under scenario B 
the game has a large rollover, and the winning combination is very unpopular. Because 
the bulk of the expected winnings in either case comes from an event with very low 
probability, in scenario A if an investor aims to have at least a 50% chance of turning an 
initial one million dollars into ten million dollars before losing half the initial capital, it 
will take on average some 22 million years for this to occur playing an optimal strategy. 
Scenario B offers only a slightly better investment opportunities. If an investor is 
satisfied with a 95% chance of reaching ten million dollars before falling to 25 thousand 
dollars, the average time to wait is down to a “mere” 2.5 million years. 
Matheson (2001) and Grote and Matheson (2005; 2006b) note, however, that 
while the purchase of individual lottery tickets rarely provide a fair bet, the purchase of 
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every number combination is much more likely to result in a positive net expected return 
at a significantly reduced level of risk. First, the purchase of every combination, denoted 
as the “Trump Ticket” by Krautmann and Ciecka (1993), guarantees the purchaser at 
least a portion of the jackpot, reducing the risk simply to how many other tickets have the 
winning combination as opposed to whether or not the jackpot is won in the first place. 
Second, the purchase of a Trump Ticket results in a higher jackpot payoff due to the large 
number tickets purchased and the allocation of the proceeds to the jackpot pool. Third, 
the purchase of the Trump Ticket has certain tax advantages as described by Matheson 
(2001). 
Grote and Matheson (2005; 2006b) find that nearly 12% of the almost 23,000 
drawings they examine would have provided a positive net return for the purchase of a 
Trump Ticket with many drawings providing an expected return in excess of 50%. The 
fact that few attempts to corner a lottery drawing have been attempted is likely due to two 
factors. First, even the purchase of a Trump Ticket may involve significant risk. While 
the Trump Ticket guarantees a share of the jackpot, it does not preclude other tickets 
from winning. In most of the cases identified by Grote and Matheson, the return from the 
Trump Ticket is only positive if no other tickets share the jackpot prize.  
Furthermore, the act of physically purchasing the every possible combination for 
a particular lottery drawing is a daunting task. In fact, in February 1992, an Australian 
consortium attempted to corner a $25 million advertised jackpot in the Virginia Lotto. 
Despite a massive effort that included enlisting the aid of a major lottery ticket retailer, 
the consortium was only able to purchase 2.4 million of the 7,059,052 possible 
combinations before time ran out. Cornering one of the larger games such as Powerball, 
Megamillions, or Euromillions would be even more difficult. Such a strategy is likely to 
be possible only for the smallest state games. However, with smaller games, while the 
rate of return might be high, the small size of the jackpot would limit the total return from 
such an effort. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 Lottery games have considerable appeal as sources of public revenues.  The 
diversity of products available as well as the adaptability of lotto structures allow 
government officials to choose games that appeal to their consitutents as well as provide 
for appropriate levels of public funding.  However, as sources of public funding, the 
literature suggests that fungibility of lottery revenues does exist, providing for lesser 
gains to public programs than might be expected.  In fact, if the funds are completely 
fungible, programs designated as beneficiaries of lottery profits may be receive just as 
much revenue after this designation as before. 
 The evidence on fungibility as an argument against the efficiency of state-run 
lotteries is both consistent and stronger than the arguments that the market for the lottery 
products are not efficient.  Particularly in the instance of state-run lotto games in the 
United States, consumers tend to exhibit rational behavior and the markets themselves do 
not tend to exhibit  positive net expected returns on a general basis.  However, individual 
violations of market efficiency do appear to occur in the form of positive expected 
returns from certain number combinations, the presence of lottery fatigue and the 
potential positive expected returns from a “Trump ticket.”  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
 
State Start Date Multi-state  2006 Revenues 
($ millions) 
2006 Profit 
($ millions)  
2006 per 
capita sales 
Alabama None  $        - $        - $        - 
Alaska None  $        - $        - $        - 
Arizona 1981 Powerball (1994) $    468.70 $    141.12 $  76.01 
Arkansas ballot 2008  $        -  $        - 
California 1985 Mega-Millions (2005) $ 3,585.00 $ 1,240.57 $   98.33 
Colorado 1983 Powerball (2001) $    468.80 $    125.60 $   98.62 
Connecticut 1972 Powerball (1995) $    970.33 $    284.87 $ 276.86 
Delaware 1975 Powerball (1991) $    727.99 $    248.80 $ 852.97 
District of C. 1982 Powerball (1988) $    266.20 $      73.40 $ 457.76 
Florida 1988 None $ 4,030.00 $ 1,230.00 $ 222.78 
Georgia 1993 Powerball (1995) 
Mega-Millions (1996) $ 3,177.59 $    822.40 $ 339.34 
Hawaii None  $        - $        - $      - 
Idaho 1989 Powerball (1990) $    131.13 $      33.00 $   89.42 
Illinois 1974 Mega-Millions (1996) $ 1,964.83 $    637.67 $ 153.12 
Indiana 1989 Powerball (1990) $    816.40 $    218.00 $ 129.31 
Iowa 1985 Powerball (1988) $    339.52 $      80.88 $ 113.85 
Kansas 1987 Powerball (1988) $    236.05 $      67.09 $   85.40 
Kentucky 1989 Powerball (1991) $    742.30 $    204.30 $ 176.48 
Louisiana 1991 Powerball (1995) $    332.12 $    118.76 $   77.46 
Maine 1974 Tri-State Lotto (1985) 
Powerball (1990-1992) 
Powerball (2004) $    229.69 $      51.70 $ 173.80 
Maryland 1973 Mega-Millions (1996) $ 1,560.91 $    500.97 $ 277.95 
Massachusetts 1972 Mega-Millions (1996) $ 4,534.12 $    951.24 $ 704.36 
Michigan 1972 Mega-Millions (1996) $ 2,212.37 $    688.02 $ 219.14 
Minnesota 1990 Powerball (1992) $    450.00 $    121.30 $   87.09 
Mississippi None  $        -  $      - 
Missouri 1986 Powerball (1988) $    913.52 $    260.67 $ 156.35 
Montana 1987 Powerball (1988) $      39.92 $        9.11 $   42.26 
Nebraska 1993 Powerball (1994) $    113.11 $      30.32 $   63.96 
Nevada None  $        - $        - $      - 
New Hampshire 1964 Tri-State Lotto (1985) 
Powerball (1996) $    262.74 $      80.32 $ 199.82 
New Jersey 1970 Mega-Millions (1999) $ 2,406.57 $    849.25 $ 275.84 
New Mexico 1996 Powerball (1996) $    154.71 $      36.86 $   79.15 
New York 1967 Mega-Millions (2002) $ 6,803.00 $ 2,203.00 $ 352.37 
North Carolina 2006 Powerball (2006) $    229.53 $      64.59 $   25.92 
North Dakota 2004 Powerball (2004) $      22.33 $        6.92 $   35.12 
Ohio 1974 Mega-Millions (2002) $ 2,221.00 $    646.30 $ 193.50 
Oklahoma 2005 Powerball (2006) $    204.84 $      68.95 $   57.23 
Oregon 1985 Powerball (1988) $ 1,104.00 $    483.00 $ 298.32 
Pennsylvania 1972 Powerball (2002) $ 3,070.00 $    975.85 $ 246.77 
Rhode Island 1974 Powerball (1988) $ 1,731.47 $    323.90 $1,621.82 
South Carolina 2002 Powerball (2002) $ 1,144.60 $    319.40 $ 264.88 
South Dakota 1987 Powerball (1990) $    686.16 $    118.99 $ 877.53 
Tennessee 2004 Powerball (2004) $    996.27 $    277.66 $ 164.98 
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Texas 1992 Mega-Millions (2003) $ 3,774.69 $ 1,036.11 $ 160.57 
Utah None  $        - $        - $      - 
Vermont 1978 Tri-State Lotto (1985) 
Powerball (2003) $    104.88 $      22.88 $ 168.10 
Virgina 1988 Mega-Millions (1996) $ 1,365.00 $    454.90 $ 178.60 
Washington 1982 Mega-Millions (2002) $    477.89 $    116.95 $   74.72 
West Virginia 1986 Powerball (1988) $ 1,522.00 $    610.00 $ 836.97 
Wisconsin 1988 Powerball (1989) $    508.90 $    150.60 $   91.59 
Wyoming None  $        - $        - $      - 
Sources: National Association of State and Provincial Lotteries; Grote and Matheson 
(2007b) 
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Table 2: Jackpot Statistics 
 
Game 
 
Period 
 
Average 
jackpot pool 
($ millions) 
Average number 
of times jackpot 
won per year  
Average 
number of 
rollovers 
Average 
number of 
winners 
Florida 1/1/03 - 12/30/06 6.05* 28.75 2.65 1.27 
Texas 5/7/03 -  4/22/06 14.72* 6.08 15.28 1.06 
Megamillions 5/17/02 - 12/29/06 32.56* 12.67 7.93 1.05 
Powerball 10/9/02 - 8/27/05 27.50* 12.28 7.65 1.20 
UK Lottery 11/19/04 - 12/29/07   10.77** 85.34 0.21 3.35 
Euromillions 2/13/04 - 12/28/07   31.28** 32.79 2.17 1.72 
 
*Value of cash option.  
**Pound and euro values converted to dollars. 
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Table 3: Use of Lottery Profits by State 
State/D.C. Education
General 
Fund
Environment / 
Conservation Development
Gambling 
Treatment
Tax 
Relief Other
Arizona  x x x   x 
California X       
Colorado  x x     
Connecticut  x      
Delaware  x      
D.C.  x      
Florida x       
Georgia x       
Idaho x      x 
Illinois x       
Indiana      X x 
Iowa  x   x  x 
Kansas  x  x   x 
Kentucky  x      
Louisiana  x   x   
Maine  x x     
Maryland  x     x 
Massachusetts       x 
Michigan x       
Minnesota  x x     
Missouri x       
Montana  x      
Nebraska x x x  x   
New Hampshire x       
New Jersey x      x 
New Mexico x       
New York x       
North Carolina x       
North Dakota  x      
Ohio x       
Oklahoma x       
Oregon x  x x   x 
Pennsylvania       x 
Rhode Island  x      
South Carolina x       
South Dakota  x    X x 
Tennessee x       
Texas x       
Vermont x       
Virginia x       
Washington x       
West Virginia x  x    x 
Wisconsin      X  
Total: 23 17 7 3 3 3 12 
Sources:  Novarro (2005) and the websites of state lottery associations. 
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